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The Office of Attorney General
in Kentucky
By

ROBERT LATANE MONTAGUEr

III*

Recently the office of Attorney General in Kentucky has again
become a subject of scholarly and legislative discussion. The
legislative activity has been set forth in House Bill, 439,** which
pertains in part to modifications of the office. This bill is the first
step of several which are needed to modernize and improve the
effectiveness of the Attorney General's functions in Kentucky.
This act has been implemented by regulations prepared by the
Attorney General which are designed to improve the internal
administrative operation of the office and to establish a better
policy with respect to requests for official opinions.
The Attorney General's office is also assuming greater responsibilities in the field of legislative drafting for both the executive
and legislative branches of the state government. This is being
accomplished through a program of maintenance of records of
all technical defects, failures to provide for unforeseen contingencies, and ambiguities in legislation which have been overlooked by the General Assembly. These records are to be presented to subsequent sessions of the General Assembly in the
form of remedial and corrective legislation. In addition, the
Attorney General's office is also beginning to function as a
receiving board for regulatory and legislative proposals to the
offices of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor. The Attorney
General's office, under this program, will serve as a legislative
research agency for the executive branch of the state government.
Another program, designed to create an awareness of the
importance of state public law, is a summer internship program
for a limited number of law students and law clerks.
* Special Assistant to Mr. John B. Breckinridge, Attorney General of Kentucky,
third year law student at the University of Virginia Law School. where he has
passed the Virginia Bar Examination.

0* Ky. Acts, 1960 Cr. 68, art. I; Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 15.025, 15.100, 15.105,
15.180, 12.210. (1960) (hereinafter cited as KRS).
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All of these programs, however, will not make the office what
it should be. It is the purpose of this study to point out some of
the problems and to propose suggestions for improvements. This
requires some discussion of the development of the Attorney
General's office and a comparison thereof with similar positions
in other states.
STAGES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE
DEVELOPMENT OF T-E OFFICE

The office of Attorney General in Kentucky, as in all states,

can trace its origin to England.' Ultimately there, the Attorney
General was considered the chief law officer of the King, and it
was at this stage that the office became part of the state and
federal governments after the Revolution. In Kentucky, the office
was first established as an appointive one,2 a policy which lent
itself to administrative efficiency. The Governor appointed the
Attorney General who held office during good behavior.
The office as it exists today has its foundation in the Constitution of 1891. The provisions concerning the Attorney General
were embodied in the short but flexible requirements of sections

91, 92 and 93 with limited control being imposed by sections 87
and 96. Under the Constitution, the duties of the office are to be
'prescribed by law." There were a number of proposals relating
to the office at the convention which never became incorporated
in the Constitution, and which will be considered later in the
present discussion.
One of the most persistent problems in the history of the
office seems to have been the question of employment of state
attorneys. The legislative acts concerning the office indicate that
the problem has been reconsidered on several occasions. First,
the Governor only was permitted to employ counsel on the
written request of a sick or incapacitated Attorney General.4
Later the Governor was empowered to employ counsel in actions
1 Clay, Lyell B., 'The Attorney General of West Virginia", Office of the
Attorney General of West Virginia, Charleston, W. Virginia, 1957, p. 1.
2 Ky. Const. art. II, § 16 (1792); Committee For Kentucky, "Blueprint for a

Greater
Kentucky", Report No. 12, p. 75 (1949).
3
Proceedings and Debates in the Convention to Adopt, Amend, or Change
the Constitution of the State of Kentucky, 1890 pp. 1128, 1286, 1880, 1445, 14981506.
4 Ky. Acts 1892, ch. 100, art. II, § 19.
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by the Commonwealth against other states or the United States.5
Finally, he was given a free hand in the administration of the
legal business of the state.6
From 1908 until 1942 legal counsel could be employed by
state officers, trustees, department heads, or institutions only in
an emergency which, in the opinion of the -Attorney General,
required employment of other counsel.7 During this period the
Court of Appeals pointed out the precise scope and meaning of
the legislation." Relying upon the wording of the statutes and its
5 Ky. Acts 1902, oh. 62.
6 Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, Ch. 8, Art. II (1903).
7 Ky. Acts 1908, ch. 32.
8 In Commonwealth v. Louisville Property Company, 141 Ky. 731, 183
S.W. 759, 761 (1911), the Court stated:
The statute as a whole indicates that the object of its enactment
was to do away with the practice, hitherto obtaining, of employing
special counsel or attorneys to represent the interest of the Commonwealth in the courts, and to require the Attorney General and his
assistants to take charge of and attend to all matters in litigation
in which the Commonwealth is, or may be, a party in interest,
whether in courts of civil or criminal jurisdiction in or out of the
state, except where it is made the duty of the Commonwealths
Attorney to represent the Commonwealth, or an emergency such as
subsection 5 contemplates micrht arise (which) would require the
Attorney General to request the Governor in writing to employ special
counsel. The Attorney General had the legal right, therefore, to
declare Pickett (contract Attorney) and his associate counsel without
authority to bring or maintain this action, and also to direct its dismissal; for not only did the statute, supra, upon becoming operative
abrogate the contract made by Pickett with the former auditor and
end his employment thereunder, but it repealed the former statute
from which that officer derived authority to employ him.
The statute was further construed in Commonwealth v. Roberta Coal Company,
186 Ky. 394, 216 S.W. 584, 587-588, 590 (1919) when the Court said:
Under this statute (Sec. 112-5) Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, it is
made the duty of the Attorney General and his assistants to attend to
all litigation and business in which the Commonwealth or any state
officer in connection with his official duties may be interested; and
no state officer or state board, commission, or head of any department
or institution of the state, or any person connected therewith, has any
authority to emnloy or to be represented by other counsel at the
expense of the state, or at the expense of any fund set apart for his
or its use, unless the Attorney General requests the employment of
such other counsel.
The statute, as we have seen, makes it the duty of his office to
attend to all litigation in which the state is concerned 'unless an
emergency arises' which in his opinion 'requires the employment of
other counsel,' and means, as we clearly think, that the emergency
must arise in respect to some particularly named suit, proceeding,
prosecution, or thing, and does not contemplate the general employment of special counsel to perform general legal services, although
such services in the opinion of the Attorney General might be of
benefit to the state.
The nature of the "emergency" envisionel in the statute was further clarified in
Gordon v. Morrow, 186 Ky. 713, 218 S.W. 258, 264 (1920) in the following terms:
(footnote continued on next page)
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prior interpretations, the Court held in Montgomery v. Gayle,'
that the State Highway Commission was not authorized to appoint
a special legal adviser, the power therefore having been denied by
the statute defining the powers and duties of the Attorney
General.
In 1942 the centralized powers of the office were again
decentralized; administrative departments were permitted to
employ counsel on the approval of the Governor.10 The Court of
Appeals, doubtful of the wisdom of the act,-1 held it constitutional.' 2
Considering the infringement of the powers of the Attorney
General the Court conceded the conflicting views of the extent
of such powers and stated:
it is certain that the Attorney General has been the
chief law officer of the federal or state governments with
...

(footnote continued from preceding page)

.. . but one purpose of the statute in allowing employment of
special counsel was to make provision for cases such as this and to
leave it to the sound judgment of these two high officers of the state
(Governor and Attorney General), to decide when an emergency
demanded the employment of special counsel. Manifestly, it is better
for the interest of the state that they should be allowed this discretion
and be permitted, in cases of great importance to the state, to employ
special counsel rather than leave the interest of the state to be looked
after by counsel that might not be fitted by experience or ability to
represent it, or to be left unrepresented when it was not the duty of
the county or Commonwealth Attorney to attend and the Attorney
General could not.
p216 Ky. 567, 228 S.W. 323 (1926).
lo Ky. Acts 1942, ch. 106.
11
The Court stated in Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel Meredith, 291 Ky.
829, 165 S.W. 2d 820 at 833 (1942):
The Act is indeed so broad in its scope as to be fraught with
opportunities for abuse and extravagance and productive of conflict
and confusion in the legal representation which has heretofore been
centralized in the Attorney General and his staff. If the authority
given by the Act should be exercised in its entirety, the Attorney
General would be relieved of many present duties and stripped of
many prerogatives which that officer has hitherto performed and
enjoyed under statutory direction and authorization or through immemorial custom. However, it is not to be assumed that the attitude
of the chief executive and his responsible heads of departments will
be so antagonistic to the public welfare that they shall concur to such
an extent that the feared evils will result. It is not supposed that they
will take their eyes off the public good.
Be that as it may, it is a principle basic in its recognition and
fundamental to the co-ordination of the two divisions of governmental
power, that the courts do not concern themselves with the wisdom,
need or appropriateness of legislation, nor the purposes motivating it.
That is left where it is put by the Constitution-in the General Assembly subject only to the veto power of the Governor.
2
1 Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel Meredith, supra note 11.
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the duty of representing
the sovereign, national or state, in
3
such capacity.'
As a matter of general recognition, unless denied specifically

by statute, the Attorney General of any state is clothed with all
powers incident to and traditionally belonging to his office and

such others as may be added by constitution or statute. 4 The
Constitution of Kentucky is one of a number which merely establish the office of Attorney General and make no specific mention
of his duties other than that they shall "be prescribed by law". 15

The Kentucky Court in Johnson v. Commonwealth,6 found that
there were at least three interpretations of this phrase among the
7
various states.'
The rule in Kentucky has been that the Attorney General has
common law authority, duties, powers and rights.' It has been

further held that these powers exist except as "limited by statute".19 Concluding that the legislature possessed the constitutional power to modify the common law in this respect, the Court
in Johnson v. Commonwealth,20 indicated that this legislative
power would not extend to making the office an empty shell by

stripping it of all its rights and duties. 2'
13 Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel Meredith, supra note 11 at 838, 165 S.W.
2d at 826.
145 Am. Jur., Attorney General, §§ 2, 5, 6, and 8 (1938); 7 C. J. S., Attorney

General, H§ 5, 6, 7,8 (1937).

15 Ky. Const. §§ 91, 93.
16 Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel Meredith, supra note 11.
17 165 S.W. 2d at 839: The legislature may not add duties but may limit or
decrease common law duties. (citing cases)
165 S.W. 2d at 840:
The term "as prescribed by law" has been held in the following cases,
in effect to negative the existence of any common law duties, so that
the Attorney General has none, and the legislature may deal with the
office at will. (citing cases).
165 S.W. 2d at 840:
The term I--- been construed in Illinois and (North Dakota) to mean
that the legislature may add to the common law duties of the office,
but they are inviolable and cannot be diminished. (citing cases).
1s Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith, supra note 11; Repass v. Commonwealth, 131 Ky. 807, 115 S.W. 1131 (1909); Chambers v. Baptist Education
Society, 40 Ky. (1 B. Mon) 215 (1841). of. Commonwealth ex rel. Ferguson v.
Gardner, 327 S.W. 2d 947 (Ky. 1959) (only those powers existing at common
law as of 1607).
19 Repass v. Commonwealth, supra note 18.
20291 Ky. 829, 165 S.W. 2d 820 (1942).
2
1 Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel Meredith, 291 Ky. 829, 165 S.W. 2d 820,
844:
. . . We are of the opinion that, while the Attorney Ceneral
possesses all the power and authority appertaining to the office under
common law and naturally and traditionally belonging to it, neverthe(footnote continued on next page)
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Failing to prevail in the Court, the Attorney General could
only resort to the General Assembly. There was temporary success in 1944, when the legislature again centralized the legal
22
activities of the state in the office of the Attorney General.
It is probable that the underlying reasons for both the 1942 and
1944 acts were political in nature and that their passage indicates
the relative state of harmony or disharmony which existed between the Attorney General and the Governor at the time of
passage.
This theory receives some corroboration by the fact that in
1948, the power of approval which had been in the Attorney
23
General was removed and placed in the hands of the Governor.
This is currently the law in Kentucky, and it greatly weakens the
effectiveness with which the Attorney General can carry out his
responsibilities, and renders it almost impossible for him to keep
adequately informed on legal matters affecting the state which
would otherwise be called to his attention more expeditiously.
THE RELATIVE POSrrlON OF KENTUCKY

The Act of 1948 has the effect of placing Kentucky in the
unique position of being the only state in the Union in which
independent counsel may "always"2 4 be employed by any administrative department, whether headed by an elected official or
otherwise. While it is not suggested that this unique attitude is
in itself unwise, it nevertheless raises the question of its advisability.
This position, representing the ultimate in what could be
termed the supremacy of the administrator in state government,
has recently been modified by a statute which requires the
(footnote continued from preceding page)

may withdraw those powers and assign
less the General Assembly
them to others or m - " authorize the employment of other counsel
for the departments and officers of the state to perform them. This,
however, is subject to the limitation that the office may not be
stripped of all duties and rights so as to leave it an empty shell, for
obviously, as the legislature cannot abolish the office entirely, it
cannot do so indirectly by depriving the incumbent of all his substantial prerogatives or by practically preventing him from discharging
the substantial things appertaining to the office.
22 KRS § 15.020-15.050.
23 KRS §§ 12.200-12.280.
24
Tentative and Preliminary, The Powers, Duties and Operations of Attorneys
General Offices", The Council of State Government, Chicago, Illinois, 1951, Table
D. (hereinafter cited as COSGO)
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governor to "consult the Attorney General as to whether the
legal services requested by departments are available in the
Attorney General's office."2 5 (Emphasis added). This section
simply tends to make the Attorney General aware of the need
for additional attorneys by other departments of the government,
but gives only a very limited degree of actual control over
employment. The governor still retains the power to approve the
hiring of additional attorneys.
Kentucky's position is to be contrasted with the opposite
extreme, represented by Michigan, where the legal system is
highly centralized and the Attorney General's staff occupies a
detached position from the administrative environment.2 With
a few exceptions, all attorneys for the State of Michigan are on
the staff of the Attorney General.27
The typical attitude of Attorneys General concerning centralization of legal services is reflected in a recent message to the
Michigan Legislature by the Attorney General in which he said:
As a private attorney prior to my taking office as
Attorney General I had observed that Assistant Attorneys
General assigned to represent particular state agencies had
a tendency to lose their identity as members of the Attorney
General's staff and to become involved in the administrative
function of the agency with which they were chiefly concerned. I have attempted during the last biennium to cure
this situation, as it is my firm belief that the Attorney General, though his assistants, may not adequately discharge his
duty as attorney for the state government unless he maintains a separate and distinct entity.... Present and past
policy makes for an institutional lawyer. The policy I suggest would in time provide the state with a legal staff
prepared to represent the state government and the people
of the
state as a whole, rather than particular state agen8
cies.2
The problem is one of determining the relative value of the
legal services rendered to the state under the two systems. The
merits of the Michigan policy are plentiful, but it is not without
shortcomings. The satisfactory functioning of a centralized sys25
KRS § 12.210.
26
Steud William L., "The Lawyer in Michigan State Government", Papers
in Public Administration No. 31, University of Michigan, 1959, p. 5.
27 Ibid.
28
Biennial Report of the Attorney General (of Michigan), 1950, p. xiii.
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tem, for example, must depend to a considerable degree on the
harmony which exists between the Attorney General, the Governor, and the administrative offices of the state. In addition, the
accentuation of a generally existing negative, if not hostile,
attitude of lawyers and administrators toward one another may
be intensified by such a system. This results primarily from the
fact that administrators are chiefly concerned with accomplishment, and the concern of a lawyer is more often likely to be the
method of accomplishment. In such a situation, it is definitely questionable as to just how valuable legal services which
are centralized can be to a state government and the people of a
state.
On the other hand, there are some cogent arguments for a
more highly centralized system. The general attitude among
lawyers working for the state of Kentucky and elsewhere 29 is

that supervision of lawyers by other lawyers is preferred. There
is, without question, a lack of competence on the part of a layman
to judge a lawyer on his professional abilities in most cases, and
it is understandable that for this reason lawyers prefer professional performance evaluation.
In addition, objectivity, a desirable characteristic in many
phases of legal work, is better achieved by attorneys who are not
directly under the control of the administrative department head
whom they represent.30 Where the lawyer is not subordinate to
an administrator, he is more apt to give a candid legal opinion
than where his position is such that he must simply produce an
argument for the administrator's point of view.
Uniformity and consistency in interpretation of statutory and
case law is another benefit resulting from a centralized legal
service, since effective coordination of the law as applied to all
agencies and functions of the state is possible when controlled by
the office of the Attorney General. However, the difficulty to be
encountered is that administrative policy within an agency may
become inconsistent when the lawyer representing the agency has
a dual responsibility to the Attorney General and the administrative department head. For where the lawyer is directly and
29 U. S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government,
"Legal Services and Procedure, Report to Congress" (Washington; Government
Printing Offce, 1955) pp. 7-8.
30 Steude, op. cit. supra, note 26 at 7.
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solely responsible to the agency head, he will be better able to
appreciate the administrative problems involved, and he will be
in a better position to fulfill a policy-making function for the
agency as well.
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion of some of the
benefits and disadvantages of a centralized legal system for the
state that more than mere centralization is necessary to achieve
the desired goal of improved handling of the legal business of
the state. Some form of compromise with absolute centralization
is likely to prove much more desirable for a state such as Kentucky, which differs with the more centralized states in a number
of respects, including size and political background. Before
offering a solution to this and some of the other questions that
arise concerning the Attorney General of Kentucky, his office
should be compared to the office in other states.
A

BmF SuRvEY OF SALmNT STATISTSCAL AND FACTUAL FrtuREs

In the past decade, the expansion which has characterized
every phase of government has not bypassed the office of Attorney
General. It is the effect of such development and growth which
forms a considerable portion of the need for a reappraisal and
possible reorganization of the office to better fit it to carry out its
continually expanding role.
One of the most obvious areas in which such expansion has
been reflected has been in the budgetary increases which have
taken place. In 1945, the appropriation for the office was $51,300,
whereas in 1957-58 the appropriation was $119,000 and for 195657, $117,600.Y The total expenditure for the two year period from
January, 1956, through December, 1957, was $235,980.95,32 and
the Attorney General indicated in his report for that year
that it would be impossible to keep within budgetary limitations
and requested an increase in the budget for the next year to
$160,556 and $167,438 for 1959-60. The relative increase in
expenditures and the approximate size of budgetary allowance
were comparable to those indicated for the states of Colorado,
31 Ky. Rev. Stat. ch. 47.
3

2 Report of the Attorney General, for the biennium beginning the first

Monday in January, 1956, and ending the thirty-first day of December 1957, p. 10.
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Maine, Maryland, North Carolina and Utah.3 In states where
extensive reorganization of the responsibilities and functions of
the office took place, there was a correspondingly large increase
of expenditures.
The salaries of the Attorney General and staff personnel have
reflected a retarded response to the increase in the cost of living,
but this had been a rather typical situation. The salaries generally appear to be favorably comparable to those offered in
states of similar size. In 1952, Kentucky was among the 30 states
which were paying the Attorney General less than $10,000, the
salary being $8,500, while by 1956 it had joined the ranks of 82
states who pay the Attorney General $10,000 or more, the salary
now being $12,000. The First Assistant Attorney General receives
$9,000 and salaries for other assistants range from $5,760 to
4

$9,000.3

In the office of every Attorney General at least some of the
employees are covered by some form of public retirement plan.
Kentucky has the old age and survivors insurance coverage under
the Federal Social Security Act, as amended, which has been
made available to state employees by over one-half of the states.
It is granted to all personnel in the office. There is also an additional state system which was enacted in 1956 to provide more
adequate income for retiring employees.3 5
At present the ten Assistant Attorneys General and the Deputy
Attorney General are appointed and removed by the Attorney
General, and this procedure is followed in 29 states. 6 In five
states the merit system is applied to the entire staff of the Attorney
General with the exception of the elected officer who heads the
department. In a considerably greater number of states, such
coverage is extensive but applies only to the clerical staff, or is
dependent upon whether the person holds his position by appointment or examination. Such a system has recently been enacted
in Kentucky, and will include the personnel of the Department
of Law by July 1, 1961.3'
33 "The Office of Attorney General Personnel and Financing" COSGO, 1955,
pp. 1-5.
34 COSGO, 1955, p. 5-6.

35 KRS §§ 61.510-61.700 (1956).
36 COSGO, 1955, p. 16.
37

Ky. Rev. Stat. cb. 18.
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One important benefit which should be derived from a merit
system is a partial neutralization of the effect of centralizing the
appointive power over all state attorneys in the hands of the
Attorney General. Not only should it have the effect of screening
out undesirable employees, but it will perhaps have an additional
effect of reducing the excessive build-up of political power in the
office of Attorney General while leaving him with the desired
elements of coordination and control over the state's legal affairs.
Under such a system in Michigan, it has been said that:3"
A bill establishing a centralized Law Department for the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, when coupled with the introduction
of such a system, would tend to remove many of the political
overtones which might otherwise accompany such a measure,
and would be a durable and valuable improvement.
The size of the present staff of the Kentucky Law Department
argues against the practical applicability of such a bill. But
when it is considered that altogether there are at least 87 lawyers
currently employed by the state of Kentucky, as well as a considerable number 9 of part-time contract attorneys, the justification
for such a system becomes more apparent. Although this figure
does not begin to compare with the number of lawyers employed
by the Law Department alone in New York, where there are 217
law-trained personnel,4 ° it nevertheless is a far better basis for
comparison than would be the number of attorneys employed
in the office itself.
It has been pointed out that the general control of the Attorney General over hiring counsel for state agencies is limited
in Kentucky as it is in no other state. In answer to the question
"Does the Attorney General exercise any jurisdiction over departmental counsel?" 15 states responded that their Attorney
General has no control or jurisdiction over such counsel. Six
38

Stuede, op. cit. supra note 26 at 32.

The significance of political affiliation cannot be denied...
but it may be said of the lawyer in Michigan state govern-

ment that his principal incentive stems from his close working relationships with fellow attorneys and his own career as
Assistant Attorney General.

39
For the period from 1955-1959, there were fifty contracts negotiated
according to a memorandum prepared by Mr. William E. Bivin of the Legislative
Research Commission, December 30, 1959.
40 COSGO, 1955, p. 17.
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states could not supply a satisfactory answer, and 27, of which
Kentucky was one, indicated that their Attorney General does
exercise some jurisdiction ranging from very slight to very
extensive.4 1 In Kentucky the Attorney General's control is confined to the appointment, approval of appointment, and supervision of attorneys serving a limited number of specified agencies,
i.e. the Highway and Revenue Departments and the Public Service and Railroad Commissions. 42 His power is similarly confined
in 12 states. This limited control, of course, offers considerable
possibilities for contrast with that exercised in such states as
Alabama, California, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Ohio, where
he has at least the power to approve any counsel hired by the
state or any of its boards, commissions, or bureaus, and thereby is
made aware of their employment.
With regard to the question of employment of part-time or
special private counsel, all but one state has indicated possession
of such authority to some degree. It is, however, usually restricted
to special circumstances, similar perhaps, to those suggested in
Gordon v. Morrow, 43 and in any event rarely employed in most
states.4 4 Where such counsel are employed, they are not referred
to as Assistant or Deputy Attorney General, and their appointment is made through the agency employing them or by the
Governor, or by both acting together. In only one-fourth of the
states does the Attorney General participate in their appointment.45 In almost all such cases the Attorney General has no
control over removal of these appointees, this function being
taken care of by the appointing authority. The salaries of such
counsel in Kentucky are initially determined by the department
head, and only in a few instances does the Attorney General have
an opportunity to approve them. This statement as to salaries
apparently applies not only to special counsel, but also to some
of the regularly employed departmental counsel.
Organization within the office of the Attorney General varies
in formality with the size of the office from state to state, and that
presently existing in Kentucky is not unusual for a state with a
41 COSGO, 1955, pp. 21-25.
42COSGO, 1955, pp. 24-25.
43186 Ky. 713, 218 S.W. 258 (1920).
44 COSGO, 1955, p. 24.
45 COSGO, 1951, p. 21.
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Law Department of similar size. There is a certain amount of
specialization by individual staff members, but such specialization
is not so complete as to preclude the value of joint consultation
between the several attorneys or to prevent their having several
fields of activity. The Attorney General is, of course, free to
handle such office organization in the manner most befitting the
current needs of the state. It has been suggested that the work
of the office can be considerably implemented with more frequent
opportunities for a pooling of the knowledge and resources of the
various attorneys in the office. At the present time meetings are
held weekly, but it is suggested that a rigid schedule of staff
gatherings should not be established and that the opportunity
for joint discussion should be available whenever any of the
attorneys feel that he has a matter which warrants it. Such meetings should include counsel assigned to other departments in
order to facilitate coordination of their work by the Attorney
General and to keep him abreast of the activities of their departments with which he should be concerned.
Before concluding this discussion of some of the administrative aspects of the office, some mention should be made of the
relationship which should exist between the Attorney General and
some of the numerous commissions, boards, and councils which
exist in proliferation in Kentucky and many other state governments. Whether the Attorney General should be a member of
any of these boards or commissions depends upon the prevailing
conception of the place of the Attorney General in state government. Should he be regarded primarily as a policy making administrator, or is he fundamentally a lawyer functioning as an
advisor to policy making administrators from an objective vantage
point? It would appear that to argue that he is anything more
than a legal advisor is inconsistent with the policy of centralization of legal services in his office, for if it be admitted that he
should serve on a number of policy making bodies, then the
argument of the administrator for close integration of the lawyer
into their departmental organization would seem to be the preferable one. But perhaps there is a better solution than the integration of the individual lawyers into the various agencies, commissions and boards. The need for a closer relationship between policy makers and legal advisers might best be satisfied by confining
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such a relationship to the higher level. Such confinement, however, raises the problem of whether the Attorney General's membership on policy making bodies should be limited to the Governor's cabinet. In view of the large number of commissions and
boards, it is unlikely that such a pyramid theory of governmental
functioning, with the Governor at the top and the Attorney General at his right hand, would be satisfactory, even if the Governor
were able to control the policy of each of the various commissioners and boards.
At present, the Attorney General is a member of a number of
commissions and boards. 46 In considering whether he should be
placed on others or removed from some of those to which he
belongs, it is suggested that the primary criterion should be
whether the function of the board or commission is such as to
directly relate its activity to the field of law, or present an exceptional need for continuing legal advice. Placing the Attorney
General on boards and commissions for the sole purpose of
providing occasional legal advice, which he would be quite able
to supply in an advisory capacity as he does to all other state
agencies, decreases considerably the time and effort available
for other primary and essential functions of the office, some of
which will be discussed, infra. In line with these thoughts, it is
suggested that he could serve effectively on such bodies as the
Legislative Research Commission, the Highway Commission, the
Election Commission and the State-Local-Federal Relations Commission. These would be in addition to those on which he
already serves (see Note 46). The Public Library Commission is
an example of those from which he could perhaps be removed.
Tim ATToNEY GENERAL AND

REPRESENTATION OF

TIM STATE IN CIvIL A.N CRInNAL PROSECUTIONS

In Kentucky and every state, the Attorney General represents
at least some of the various agencies of the state in any litigation
in which they may become involved. He ordinarily attends' to
the entire process of civil litigation, although in criminal matters,
40 Constitutional Review Commission, KRS §7.170, Subsec. 2; Records Control
Board, KRS §12.195; Sinking Fund Commission, KRS §41.380; State Property and
Buildings Commission, KRS §56.450; County Debt Commission, KRS §66.300;
Board of Trustees of Teacher's Retirement System, KRS §161.250; Public Library
Service Commission, KRS §171.202; Archives and Records Commission, KRS
§171.420; Water Pollution Control Commission, KRS §220.600.
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he is limited to the appellate level. 47 This is in keeping with the
general American trend to emphasize the activities of the Attorney
General in the field of civil litigation and to leave the handling of
criminal matters largely in the hands of local prosecutors, usually
without adequate Attorney General supervision.4 8 This is contrary to the common law under which the Attorney General
did have powers to initiate criminal prosecution. In recent years,
there has been a growth of effort to reinstate more effective control of criminal law enforcement and prosecutions at the state
level, in order to combat organized crime more effectively.49
Except as limited by the effect of departmental counsel, contract attorneys, and commonwealth attorneys, the Attorney General has complete control of civil matters in Kentucky. Where
these counsel have primary responsibility, he may still file a brief
as amicus curiae. The use of departmental counsel is sometimes
desirable in cases where one department of the state government
is engaged in litigation against the other, and this is the policy
followed in Kentucky. In other states, the Attorney General may
represent both sides of such cases, and in others he takes one side
leaving the other to special counsel.5 0 These other alternatives
are worthy of consideration in view of the fact that the Attorney
General, by virtue of representing the interest of the state as a
whole, is in a better position to shape the outcome of the controversy to best coincide with the needs of the state.
The area in which the control exercised by the Attorney General is most lacking in Kentucky as elsewhere is in the field of
criminal prosecution. The legislative grant of criminal prosecution powers to local prosecutors has been construed as vesting
such powers exclusively in the local prosecutors. The Attorney
General is charged with handling criminal appeals in the highest
state court and with prosecuting violations of a number of specific
statutes.5 1 Upon rare occasions he has utilized staff members to
47 KRS § 15.090; COSGO, 1951, p. 53.
48 COSGO, "Attorney General and Law Enforcement" 1951, p. 1.
49 COSGO, 1951, p. 3.

50 COSGO, "Powers, Duties, and Operations of the Attorney Generals' Offices",
51 1951, p. 49.
Institute actions to dissolve or liquidate cooperative life insurance company,
KRS §299.190; fraternal benefit society, KRS §300.270; Prosecute violations of
accountancy law, KRS §325.990; Appear in Disbarment proceedings, KRS §§
80.180, 30.190; Institute actions to recover fines imposed by Keneral Assembly,
(footnote continued on next page)
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handle investigations into criminal charges against state officials
52
or firms or persons dealing with the state.
Before proceeding further with a discussion of criminal
prosecution by the Attorney General, a brief statement of the
general attitude of the courts and the obstacles to be overcome
in effecting any change in existing relationships is in order.
It should be pointed out in this connection that securing
judicial sanction of such attempts to exercise common law
powers presents difficult problems for an Attorney General.
He must persuade the court that the common law power
does not conflict with the constitutional and statutory law
of the state. Moreover, taken in conjunction with the
relatively infrequent use of such powers in most states and
with the strongly held popular belief that criminal prosecution is the responsibility of local officials, any such attempt
is likely to involve legal contest and protracted litigation as
to whether the Attorney General has the right to exercise
such a power. The local prosecutor, frequently one of the
most powerful political figures in the local community and
fortified by a strong legal claim to responsibility and power
by constitutional delegation, may well challenge the right
53
of the Attorney General to exercise the contested power.
Any powers and authority which the Attorney General may
seek to exercise in the area of criminal prosecution must be
derived initially from either the common law or specific constitutional or statutory grants. Where there has been any recognition of such power, it has taken the form of either supercession,
intervention, investigation, or other more limited forms of supervision and assistance in criminal prosecutions.
The courts have construed the potentially broad common law
powers of the Attorneys General in this area rather narrowly,
especially when their holdings are compared to the control exercised by the English Attorney General of the 18th century.5 4 The
instances of recognition by American courts of such authority
(footnote continued from preceding page)

KRS §6.130; Prosecute violations of banidng laws, KRS §287.990; Prosecute viola-

tions of building and loan association laws, KRS §289.990; Prosecute actions for
usurption of office, KRS §415.050; Prosecute actions to repeal or vacate a charter,
KRS §§ 271.990 and 415.010; Prosecute violations of agricultural seed laws, KRS
§250.160; Workmen's Compensation Act, KRS §342.425; Unemployment Compensation Act, KRS §341.570.
52 COSGO, "The Attorney General and Law Enforcement", 1951, p. 53.
5
3 COSGO, op. cit. supra note 53 at 10.
54 COSGO, op. cit. supra note 53 at 11.
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are the unusual rather than the general rule. They have included
holdings, however, which recognize the right of the Attorney
General to advise the local prosecutor,55 to assist the local prosecutor in a specific action,56 to attend grand jury proceedings,57
to intervene for the purpose of prosecution, 58 to intervene to enter
a nolle prosequi,59 to institute criminal proceedings, 0c and in very
limited and questionable circumstances to supersede a local
prosecutor."' These powers, usually sanctioned only as to specific
actions, appear to constitute the maximum limits of the common
law powers that the courts will recognize today, 2 and there is
doubt as to whether even this limited degree of authority would
be sanctioned in Kentucky, in view of statutory and constitutional
considerations.
Despite the limitations attending any expanded use of the
common law powers, their potential value should be considered.
They may afford an Attorney General in a state such as Kentucky,
where the common law powers are recognized except as restricted by statute or constitution, with authority to advise and
to assist the local prosecutor but probably not to institute
criminal proceedings or to intervene in actions commenced by
local prosecutors where circumstances warrant such action. While
this has not represented the past trend in Kentucky, exercise of
such power does not appear to have been proscribed by legislation
or constitution specifically. The fact that it could be exercised
might serve as an effective stimulant to criminal law enforcement
in the state.
Regardless of how far a court may permit the common law
powers to be extended, additional statutory or constitutional
authorization would be required to properly confer any desirable
degree of supervisory or coordinating power over the activities of
local prosecutors.
Very few (five) states have specific constitutional provisions
55 State v. Ehrlick, 65 W. Va. 700, 64 S.E. 935 (1909).
56 State v. Robinson, 101 Minn. 277, 112 N.W. 269 (1907)
57 State v. Koslowsky, 288 Mass. 379, 131 N.E. 207 (1921).
58 People v. Rich, 287 Mich. 481, 212 N.W. 105 (1927).
59 State v. Thompson, 10 N.E. (3 Hawks) 618 (1825).
60 State v. Karston, 208 Ark. 703, 187 S.W. 2d 327 (1945).
61
Appeal of Margiotti, 75 A. 2d 465 (Pa. 1950); see also "The Common Law
Power of State Attorneys General to Supersede Local Prosecutors", 60 Yale L.J.
559 (1951) and "Attorney General Versus District Attorney", 99 U. Pa. L. Rev.
826 (1951) also Note, 37 Va. L. Rev. 132 (1951).
62 COSGO, op. cit. supra note 53 at 11.
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relating to the role of the Attorney General in criminal prosecutions. ° California has what is probably the most comprehensive
and significant provision. 4
Subject to the powers and duties of the Governor vested
in him by Article V. of the Constitution, the Attorney General shall be the chief law officer of the state and it shall be
his duty to see that the laws of the State of California are
uniformly and adequately enforced in every county of the
State. He shall direct supervision over every district attorney and sheriff and over such other law enforcement
officers as may be designated by law, in all matters pertaining to the duties of their respective offices, and may
require any of said officers to make to him such written
reports concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution,
and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions as
may seem advisable. Whenever in the opinion of the Attorney General any law of the state is not being adequately
enforced in any county, it shall be the duty of the Attorney
General to prosecute any violations of law of which the
superior court shall have jurisdiction, and in such cases he
shall have all the powers of a district attorney. When required by the public interest, or directed by the Governor,
he shall assist any district attorney in the discharge of his
duties . . .
Such positive declarations of constitutional authority are not
to be found in Kentucky or most other states, but similar powers
are conferred in a number of states to varying degrees by legislative enactment.
Over two thirds (38) of the states give the Attorney General
power to initiate and conduct criminal proceedings independently
of the local prosecutor either on his own initiative or at the
discretion of some other authority. Kentucky is one of a subgroup of six states within this number that grant this power only
in connection with a limited number of statutes. In ten states the
Attorney General has no such power either by Constitution or by
statute.0 5
The Attorney General may, on his own initiative, intervene in
criminal proceedings commenced by local prosecutors in 22 states,
and he has the power of intervention in 16 other states when
03 COSGO, op. cit. supra note 53 at 12.

04 Cal. Const. art. V. § 21 as ammended in 1934.

65 COSGO, op. cit. supra note 53 at 15.
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requested to do so by other authority, usually the Governor or
the Legislature, and occasionally the local prosecutor. Kentucky
is one of the ten remaining states in which he has no general
power of this nature with respect to criminal cases.6 It is doubtfully inferable in civil cases where the Governor may employ
counsel to assist the Commonwealth's attorney under KRS section
69.010. In such an instance, KRS section 12.210 requires the
Governor to consult with the Attorney General as to whether
legal services required by a department are available in his office.
If Commonwealth's attorneys be included within the term "department", the inference would follow.
Eighteen states have statutes authorizing the Attorney General
to assist local prosecutors in the initiation and conduct of
criminal proceedings, such assistance being given when requested
by the local prosecutor in three of these. Kentucky is not in7
cluded within this group.
Kentucky is one of 34 states in which supercession, the power
to dismiss the local prosecutor from the proceedings entirely, is
not among those powers possessed by the Attorney General. In
14 states, however, this power is exercised to a limited degree.68
In addition to these more direct forms of control over local
criminal prosecutions, eighteen states have statutes giving the
Attorney General "supervisory" power over these activities and
seven others have some limited form of "supervision". But in
nearly one-half of the states, such supervisory power as may
exist is derived from the other powers already discussed. Ken69
tucky is in this group.
The practice of holding periodic meetings of local prosecutors
and law enforcement officials is employed in a few states to
70
discuss problems arising in the enforcement of criminal law.
This and the other supervisory functions discussed herein, could,
if effectively carried out result in the placement of effective
control over criminal prosecutions in the hands of the Attorney
General, but all such provisions have been narrowly construed,
and in most instances, the facilities necessary to carry them out
66
67
68
69
70

COSGO,
COSGO,
COSGO,
COSGO,
COSCO,

op. cit. supra note 53 at 16.
op. cit. supra note 53 at 17.
op. cit. supra note 53 at 18.
op. cit. supra note 53 at 18-19.
op. cit. supra note 53 at 19.
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have not been made available. This restrictive attitude on the
part of the courts, when coupled with the practical difficulty of
exercising continued direction and control over local prosecutors
who are frequently powerful political figures and jealous of their
independence from outside supervision, will tend to limit the
success of any efforts by the Attorney General in this direction.
The fact that in terms of realistic politics any proposals for
revising the supervisory functions of the Attorney General over
criminal prosecutors in the state would receive severe limitation
if not rejection, does not alter the fact that improvements in this
area are needed now. This need will continue to grow in future
years. The alternatives for meeting such needs resolve into two
basic approaches. One would involve the establishment of an
entirely separate Department of Criminal Justice headed by a
director who would be entirely independent of the Attorney
General. The other approach would be to substantially increase
the powers of the Attorney General and the size of his staff in
order to deal adequately with the problem.7 '
At present, there is in Kentucky, complete lack of vertical
administrative responsibility in the area of criminal investigation
and prosecution. The copious evidence of the existence of vast
networks of well organized crime is ample justification for
measures to increase the effectiveness with which the Attorney
General acting as a representative of the whole state, can operate
to destroy these criminal operations.
The resources of the office as it exists now are far from adequate for the task. Not only in terms of its powers and duties, but
also in terms of its organization and size would it have to be
revised. Both of the alternative approaches mentioned above
would be theoretically feasible. For a state of Kentucky's size,
modification of the Attorney General's office would probably be
satisfactory. There appear to be no constitutional limitations on
71 See The Model Department of Justice Act, drafted by the American Bar
Association Commission on organized crime and approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1952 which presents a comprehensive legislative proposal for the accomplishment of many of the reforms
needed elsewhere, but particularly in Kentucky. This proposed legislation has
been available for eight (8) years and has yet to be adopted in its entirety by
any state although parts of it are found in the laws of a number of states. Here
may lie an opportunity for Kentucky to be first in the nation. This act represents
sound professional thinking on the subject worth of considerable respect.
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the authority of the Legislature in Kentucky to grant him the
additional powers and resources which he needs in order to function properly in this area.
On the appellate level, the power of the Attorney General is
more extensive in most (86) states. In Kentucky as well as 85
others, the Attorney General has the duty to prosecute criminal
appeals. In some of these states, of which Kentucky is one, the
brief in these cases is prepared by the office of the Attorney

General. It has been suggested that briefs in the lower court
prosecutions should be submitted to the office of the Attorney
General for approval and suggestions. This would help to avoid
errors on the local level which might later prove difficult to
eradicate, and would be an aid to local prosecutors as well, but it
would have to be carefully regulated in order to avoid abuse of
such a plan. Regulations similar to those provided for the
issuance of opinions might be appropriate.
Local prosecutors are elected in Kentucky and 48 other states,
and the Attorney General has no control over their removal, this
being accomplished by impeachment in Kentucky. In only two
of the smaller states does
the Attorney General exercise direct
72
control in this respect.
The demonstrated ineffectiveness of Kentucky's removal procedure makes it seem advisable to consider possible improvement
in this area. 73 Additional methods for more effective removal of
prosecutors who fail to perform their duties satisfactorily are
suggested in the Conclusion.
The Attorney General is empowered to require reports from
the local prosecutors in regard to their office in 17 states, but
Kentucky is not included in this group. Such reports have been
found useful, not only as an element of control through knowledge

of their activities, but also as an important source of
in the compilation of statewide criminal statistics
information supplied therein is sufficiently complete.
quate in this respect, the reports must supply more

information
where the
To be adethan just a

tabulation of indictments and dispositions of cases. 74 If no other
COSGO, op. cit. supra note 53 at 22.
Northcutt v. Howard, 270 Ky. 219, 130 S.W. 2d 70 (1939); Commonwealth v. Howard, 297 Ky. 488, 180 S.W. 2d 415 (1944); Wilbur v. Howard 70
F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Ky. 1947); Howard v. Wilbur, 166 F. 884 (6th Cir. 1948).
74 Model Department of Justice Act, American Bar Association Commission
on Organized Crime, § 10 (2) and comment (1952).
72
73
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form of supervision were to be exercised, it would certainly seem
that the task of submitting a full and accurate report of his
activities to the Attorney General would not unduly burden the
several county attorneys, and it would provide the Attorney
General with information of value to him in carrying out his
criminal functions at the appellate level. No conscientious county
or Commonwealth's Attorney should object to such a requirement
as an undue interference with his political independence, but on
the contrary should welcome the opportunity to demonstrate the
proficiency with which he has been prosecuting the criminal cases
in his community.
The practice of submitting such reports, when combined with
the submission of all criminal briefs to the Attorney General for
approval and suggestions, as is employed in Louisiana,7 5 for
example, would give the office of Attorney General an effective
measure of control in the area of criminal prosecution without
over-burdening the office with the duties of local prosecutors. It
would tend to contribute to a spirit of cooperation between the
local attorneys and the office of Attorney General. Perhaps the
best form for such a reporting system to take would be that
followed in the two states of Idaho and Montana, where the
Attorney General can require reports on demand in the form
specified by him.h Any further effort at supervision could more
profitably develop from such a set-up assuming that this would
be a preliminary step toward reform in this area.
In addition to his relationship with the local prosecuting
attorneys, the Attorney General in some states (11) has the power
to direct or assist in the direction of the activities of police
officials and agencies. Kentucky is not one of these. The desirability of such a relationship is made readily apparent when it is
realized that these officials and agencies provide most of the
evidence used in prosecuting a criminal case. In these eleven
states, the power exercised by the Attorney General consists of
his being able to require police investigation of crimes over which
he has prosecuting responsibilities or to use state police officials
77
in communities where local law enforcement has broken down.
In some instances he may use the police to provide certain
75 COSGO, op. cit supra note 53 at 20.

76 Ibid.
7 COSGO, op. cit. supra note 53 at 31.
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technical services or to act as a clearing house for information
relating to criminal law enforcement. Such control, however, is
generally exercised at the local level.
Complete centralization of criminal prosecutions at the state
7
level has been achieved only in Delaware and BRhode Island,
and varying degrees of centralization have been achieved in
nearly every other state. It is by no means suggested that such
complete centralization is essential or practical for Kentucky.
But in considering where the best balance can be found in this
respect, the primary goal should be to achieve a relationship
which will give an added stimulus to efficient prosecution on the
local level while making the Attorney General's Office available
where needed in a particular instance.
Specific statutory enactments would be the most efficacious
means of accomplishing any desired changes rather than reliance
on interpretation of the common law by the courts or constitutional amendment. A consideration of the traditionally independent position of the local Commonwealth Attorney in Kentucky, and the limited facilities currently available to the Attorney
General, make extensive modification of the structure and powers
of the office difficult, politically, to achieve. On the other
hand, there definitely appears to be a need for closer cooperation between the state Attorney General and local prosecutors which can best be achieved through an adequate
exchange of information, supervisory powers and assistance in
areas where they are felt necessary by the Governor or by the
Attorney General acting in concurrence with the local prosecutor,
and provisions for intervention or supercession at the local level
in cases of particular interest to the state at large. Such action
should be taken by the Attorney General when requested to do
so by the Governor or by a petition signed by twenty-five (25)
percent of those voting in the last general election in the locality
involved as certified by the clerk of the court, or by other appropriate authority such as a grand jury. The net effect of any such
changes should not be to strip the offices of Commonwealth Attorney and county attorney of their political significance nor to
greatly iicrease the power of the Attorney General except as is
78

COSGO, op. cit. supra note 53 at 32.
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considered necessary for the more efficient handling of the state's
legal business as a counteraction to increased criminal activity.
Conclusion
The conclusion to this study is presented in the form of
several suggested amendatory bills designed for introduction to
the Kentucky General Assembly. They represent a possible solution to some of the questions which have been raised, but by no
means the only one. Their fundamental aim is to create a more
centralized form of legal service for the Commonwealth of
Kentucky while striving simultaneously to satisfy the demands
of administrators for a closer relationship with the legal counsel
which is available to them. When the existing system is considered in conjunction with that existing in other states and with
the expressed opinions of the personnel who comprise it, there
remains little doubt that some further changes, designed with the
particular needs of Kentucky in mind, must be forthcoming to
increase the efficiency, objectivity, and relevancy of the work of
the attorneys employed by the state of Kentucky in all capacities.
The first suggestion concerns the centralization of control of
the appointment of, what are now termed, contract attorneys in
the hands of the Attorney General.
AN ACT relating to the Department of Law providing for
the employment of special counsel for the Commonwealth,
repealing Sections 12.200, 12.210, 12.220 and 12.280 of the

Kentucky Revised Statutes.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky:
Section 1. In order to centralize and coordinate all legal
services available to the government of the Commonwealth
of Kentucky, to establish the position of such attorneys as
may be required by the several agencies, departments, and
officials of the Commonwealth of Kentucky in addition to
those regularly employed in the legal service of the state,
and to improve the relationship of lawyers employed by the
Commonwealth in such capacity to the agencies, departments, and officials which they may serve and to the
Attorney General, temporary appointments to attorney positions shall be made in accordance with the following provisions.
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Section 2. (1) No state agency, department, or official shall
employ or be represented by an attorney other than the
Attorney General unless an emergency arises, which, in the
opinion of the Attorney General, requires the employment
of other or additional counsel to protect the interest of the
Commonwealth, or a litigation arises in which the Attorney
General has an adverse interest. In either event, the Attorney General shall in writing set forth the reasons for the
employment and request the Governor to employ such other
or additional counsel.
(2) When an occasion arises, which, in the opinion of a
State agent or official, requires the employment of an attorney, the Attorney General shall be immediately informed
in writing of such requirements in order that he may
promptly and properly determine whether an emergency
such as is anticipated in subsection (1) exists. In the event
that he determines that counsel cannot be supplied by the
existing legal staff, he may authorize the appointment of
specific additional attorneys by requesting that the Governor employ them. Such attorneys shall be temporarily employed, and they shall not be controlled by the requirements
of the Civil Service Commission.
(3) Before other or additional counsel is employed, his fee
and compensation shall be fixed by written contract by the
Attorney General and the counsel, subject to the approval
of the Governor and the agency, department, or official for
whom the attorney is to be employed. Compensation for
such additional attorneys shall be derived from funds appropriated for the department being served. The written request for counsel and a copy of the contract shall be filed
in the office of the Secretary of State; a copy of the written
request and the contract shall be kept on file in the office
of the Attorney General.
(4) In the event that additional counsel must be employed
because the Attorney General has an adverse interest in the
litigation, the contract employing said other counsel shall
be made by the agency, department or official concerned
subject to the approval of the Governor. A copy of such
contract shall also be filed in the office of the Secretary of
State and the office of the Attorney General.
(5) Except in those cases where the Attorney General has
an adverse interest, any such additional counsel which are
employed by the various agencies, departments, or officials
of the Commonwealth shall be responsible to the Attorney
General for the satisfactory performance of their profes-
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sional functions as a lawyer acting for the Commonwealth,
and to the agency, department, or official by whom em-

ployed for their contribution to the accomplishment of the
policies and objectives of such agency, department, or
official.
(6) Any attorney or attorneys employed pursuant to the
provisions of this section shall have authority to appear as
the attorney for and to represent the agency, department, or
official in the trial and argument of any cases and proceedings in the Kentucky Court of Appeals and in any and all
other courts, and before boards, governmental agencies and
tribunals in or out of this Commonwealth whenever such
department or any officer or any employee or official thereof
is a party in interest or the official rights, powers or duties
of the department or any employee or official thereof are
directly or indirectly affected.
Such attorney or attorneys may institute and prosecute
any suits, motions, actions, and proceedings necessary to
cause the assessment of property, the collection of taxes,
and the payment of all claims, accounts, demands and
judgments of the Commonwealth, for the assessment or
collection of which the department may be charged by law,
and to take all necessary steps by suit, motion, action, or
otherwise to collect or cause to be collected and paid into
the State Treasury all such claims, demands, accounts, and
judgments. Any attorney or attorneys so employed shall
attend to any litigation and legal business within and without the state, required of him or them, by the terms of his
or their employment; and also any litigation or legal business
that any official of such department or agency may have in
connection with or growing out of his official duties or the
official duties of the department or agency; and he or they,
upon the written request of any executive or ministerial
officer of the department, shall give such department or
official his written opinion as to the duties of such official
and shall prepare proper drafts of all instruments of writing
and perform such other legal services pertaining to the
functions of the department as may be provided by the
terms of employment.
Section 3. Sections 12.200, 12.210, 12.220 and 12.230 of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes, and Chapter 122, Acts of the
General Assembly (1948) are repealed.
The next recommendation is intended as a corollary to Chapter 63 of the Kentucky Acts of 1960. It would embody provisions
relating to those attorneys regularly employed by the Common-
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wealth, and by classifying 87 or more of them within the civil
service, would attempt to neutralize any excessive build-up of
political power in the hands of the Attorney General. At the same
time it would provide for a more efficient career legal service.
AN ACT relating to Attorneys regularly employed by the
Commonwealth of Kentucky.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky:
Section 1. In order to promote efficiency in the government,
to facilitate the recruitment, employment, and retention of
lawyers of outstanding character and ability in the legal
service of the Commonwealth, and to assure the performance of the legal work of the government in accordance with high professional standards, all attorneys and
clerical personnel connected with the Law Department who
are employed by the Commonwealth, with the exception
of those holding elective positions and one additional exemption to be filled at the discretion of the Attorney General, shall be included within the civil service of the Commonwealth.
Section 2. The Attorney General, in cooperation with the
Civil Service Commission, shall be responsible for determining the number of designated attorney positions required
by the Government of the Commonwealth, its agencies, and
departments, and shall be kept informed by the Civil
Service Commission of the current status of those positions
at all times. All attorney positions in the government of the
Commonwealth shall be so designated only with the advice
and consent of the Attorney General. The attorney positions
in the Government of the Commonwealth shall include the
following designations as well as such others as may be
found necessary: Attorney (1605); Assistant Reviser of
Statutes (1610); Senior Attorney (1615); Referee (1620);
Principal Attorney (1621); Assistant Attorney General (1625);
Reviser of Statutes (1628); Departmental Assistant Attorney General (1630); First Assistant Attorney General (1640).
Section 8. All persons occupying attorney positions established in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 shall
be under the professional supervision and evaluation of the
Attorney General and the senior legal officer of the department or agency in which they may be employed where
such officer is provided for. The assignment, promotion,
separation in the course of a reduction in force, and dismissal of such attorneys shall be effectuated by, or subject
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to the approval of, the senior legal officer concerned and the
Attorney General. The initial selection and employment of
such attorneys and clerical personnel shall be in accordance
with such procedures as may be established by the Civil
Service Commission.
Section 4. All attorneys who are primarily employed in the
work of a particular agency, department or official shall be
additionally responsible to that agency, department, or
official for their contribution to the policies and objectives
of such agency, department, or official. It shall be within
the discretion of any official or the head of any department
or agency to request the transfer of such attorneys when it
is felt that they do not satisfactorily contribute to this
purpose, but only the Attorney General in cooperation with
the senior legal officer of a department or agency may
determine the adequacy of an attorney's performance of
duty from a professional standpoint.
It is not the purpose of this discussion to offer a complete
proposal for the establishment of a civil service merit system in
Kentucky, but to suggest how the Law Department might be
integrated into the system as it is put into effect. There would
naturally be a need for considerably more detailed organization
plans, but the suggested bill simply proposes a framework in
which these could be established.
There is a third area which has come under consideration
and which also offers opportunities for improvement. It is not
considered that any sweeping reorganization of the relationship
of the Attorney General to the local criminal prosecutors or Commonwealth Attorneys such as that contemplated by the Model
Department of Justice Act, would be practically feasible or really
necessary at the present time although it is ultimately theoretically desirable. There are, however, some practices which
would, if introduced, undoubtedly further the development of a
more cooperative relationship between criminal prosecutors on
the local level and the Attorney General and his assistants.
These are embodied in the following suggested bill.
AN ACT concerning the relationship of the Attorney General to the Commonwealth's Attorneys.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky:
Section 1. In order to facilitate the exchange of information,
foster a spirit of cooperation, and to promote the vigorous
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prosecution of criminal cases in the Commonwealth, Section 15.020 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes is amended
to read as follows:
Note: a statement of the section as it is now written is
omitted here. The suggestions are intended as a supplement.)
Section 2. In all cases where it is made the duty of the
Commonwealth's or county attorney to represent the Commonwealth, the Attorney General shall exercise advisory and
general supervisory powers with a view to obtaining effective and uniform enforcement of the criminal laws throughout the state.
Section 3. The Attorney General shall from time to time
require of these attorneys reports as to the condition of
public business entrusted to their charge. These reports
shall be in the form prescribed by the Attorney General,
and they must be submitted no less frequently than once
per annum.
Section 4. Any prosecuting attorney may request in writing
the assistance of the Attorney General in the conduct of
any criminal investigation or proceeding. The Attorney
General may take whatever action he deems necessary in
rendering such assistance.
Section 5. Whenever requested in writing by the Governor,
or by the grand jury of a county, or by a petition signed by
twenty-five (25) per cent of those voting in the last general
election of a county or city concerned, as certified by the
clerk of the court, the Attorney General shall either supersede and relieve the prosecuting attorney, or intervene in
any investigation, or criminal action, instituted by the
prosecuting attorney for the purpose of conducting any
proceedings necessary to preserve the rights and interests
of the state. Any such requests shall be confined to circumstances which are considered of particular significance to
the welfare of the Commonwealth or which are beyond
the resources of the local prosecutor to handle effectively.
Section 6. In the event that the Attorney General believes
that the best interests of the State will be furthered by so
doing, he may call the attention of the Governor to the
existence of circumstances such as those prescribed in Section 5, supra, and request the Governor's permission to
supersede or intervene as the merits of the situation may
require.
Section 7. Whenever the Attorney General shall undertake
any of the actions prescribed herein, he shall be authorized
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to exercise all powers and perform all duties in respect to
such criminal actions or proceedings which the prosecuting
attorney would otherwise perform or exercise, including
specifically, but not exclusively, the authority to sign, file
and present any and all complaints, affidavits, informations,
presentments, accusations, indictments, subpoenas, and
process of any kind, and to appear before all magistrates,
grand juries, courts or tribunals. The Attorney General
shall have full charge of such investigations, criminal actions
or proceedings, and in respect to the same, the prosecuting
attorney shall exercise only such powers and perform such
duties as are required of him by the Attorney General.
Section 8. Except as provided in this Act, the powers and
duties conferred upon or required of the Attorney General
by this Act shall not be construed to deprive the prosecuting
attorney of any of their authority in respect to criminal
prosecutions, or relieve them from any of their duties to
enforce the criminal laws of this Commonwealth. All that
is intended by this Act is to introduce the basic concept of
administrative responsibility into the field of criminal
prosecution.
In addition to this basic legislation, two corollary enactments

are recommended to completely fill out the picture. Section 9 of
the Model Department of Justice Act represents a vitally needed
solution to the problem of removal of prosecuting attorneys when
they are found to have failed to carry out the prescribed obligation of their office.
AN ACT relating to the Removal of Prosecuting Attorneys.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky:
In addition to any and all methods now provided for by
law for removal of a prosecuting attorney, such officials may
be removed from office as hereinafter provided.
(1) The Governor may, if sufficient cause is shown therefor
and it appears the public good so requires, remove from
office any prosecuting attorney after a public hearing and
upon due notice and an opportunity to be heard in his
defense or
(2) Any prosecuting attorney, if sufficient cause is shown
therefor and it appears that the public good so requires, may
be removed upon petition addressed to the Court of Appeals. Such petition shall be filed only with leave of court.
As a practical matter, if the Attorney General is given the
substantial increase in his duties and obligations, recommended
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herein, he will need an increased measure of cooperation from
the various law enforcement officers of the Commonwealth as
well as substantial additional financial and personnel resources
for the office itself. The proper degree of cooperation could be
insured by a measure such as the following:
AN ACT relating to the Development of Cooperation between Sheriffs, Police, Prosecuting Officials, and the Attorney General.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky:
(1) It shall be the duty of the sheriffs of the several counties
and of the police officers of the several municipalities of this
Commonwealth to cooperate with and aid the Attorney
General and the several prosecuting attorneys in the performance of their respective duties.
(2) It shall be the duty of the several prosecuting attorneys
of this Commonwealth to cooperate with and aid the Attorney General in the performance of his duties.
(3) The Attorney General may, from time to time, and as
often as may be required, call into conference the prosecuting attorneys and sheriffs of the several counties and the
chiefs of police of the several municipalities of this Commonwealth or such of them as he may deem advisable, for
the purpose of discussing the duties of their respective
offices with the view to the adequate and uniform enforcement of the criminal laws of this Commonwealth. Each
prosecuting attorney, sheriff or chief of police shall be
allowed his actual and necessary expenses incurred in
attending a conference with the Attorney General.
If it is possible for the suggested legislation to become law,
and for some of the other recommendations contained herein to
be carried out, certainly the position of the Law Department and
the office of the Attorney General would be more vital and
effective in the performance of legal services for the Commonwealth. Were such changes made, it would be most appropriate
to rename the department headed by the Attorney General, the
Department of Law and Justice. Present conditions leave the
legal work of the state in an uncoordinated morass of misunderstanding. It is time for the situation to be rectified.

